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Even if a state has the absolute sovereign authority t9 conlrol the entry of refugee
claimants, and that absolute sovereign authority is based on the obligation of the state
to serve the self-interest of its mcmbers, nevertheless that absolute sovercigrty must be
qualified to grant rigbts to arrivals who are refugee claimants. This conclusion follows:
a) logicaly from the premises of such a state, since such an extension recognizes the
priority of setf-initiated actions over bureaucratic oncs;
b) from thc necessity to give witness to the fundamental values of a state based on
self-interest:
c) as a litmus test of whether a state is indeed based on individual self-interes[
d) from the necessity to pres€rve international order, which is h cveryone's sclf-
interest.
Tlre paper then argues that a w&tern liberal sate does ndt, however, have absolute
sovereign authority, not only with rcsp€ct to its owrr members, particularly in areas such
as providing aid to refugees, but also with respcct to stateless individuals or individuals
who come from states which have failed to provide protectioo. Such individuals have
rights which qualify the absolute authority of a state,
Redefining Asylum
Traditionally, there are three and only thre durable solutions to the problem
of refugees: first, voluntary repatriation to the country from which the refugee
fled; second, settlement and integration in the counay of first asylum; and
third, resettlement in a country abroad.
Asylum in international law is generally seen as a contrast with a durable
solution for refugees in that itis temporary. Thus, refugees in Thailaird from
Indochina have received asylum, i.e.,. temporary refuge, until they can be
r€settled abroad or repatriated to the country from which they fled. Asylum is
also used to refer to the beatment accorded non-Convention refugees, that is,
refugees who cannot quatify under the international Convention as capable of
personally establishing a well-founded feat of persecution. They may simpty
be fleeing wanton killing and indiscriminate violence, compulsory military ser-
vice in a war they did not support (American draft dodgers and deserters), or
may have been subjected to coercion and intimidation but not outright persecu-
tion. These are sometimes referred to as Humanitarian in contrast to Conven-
tion refugees. (Humanirarian refugees have many designations; for.example,
. in Sweden they are called B refugees, whereas in Canadian law they are referred
to as designated class immigrans.)
One no sooner makes these tidy abstract distinctions than they begin to fall
apart. Originally, temporary refuge or asyhrrn was viewed as an interim step
whereby a state accepted the principle of non-refoulement 
- 
that is, not forc-
ing an individual to return to the state from which he fled where his life might
be in danger 
- 
but where the state did not want that individual is a permanent
meqber of the political community. Temporary asylum was therefore relevant
only where repatriation or resettlement. abroad was a prospect in the
foreseeable future. When the p_rospect of repatriation becane more and more
remote, and camps filled up faster than iesettlement offers could empty them,
then asylum led to the creition of a permanent class of refugees. The vision of
Palestinians, many of who4, forty years after tbe original conflict, are still
without membership in a state which guarantees their protection, baunts the
international community. The result is thit countries of lirst asylun, such as
Thailand and Hong Kong, adopt programDes of 'hunane' deterrence to
discourage new arrivals and to encourage those already present to risk
repatriation. They resent the resettlenent countries, who have skimmed the
cream and teft the aged, crippled, psychologically disturbed, ill, and illiterate
a9 a problem for local authorities 
- 
countries with the least economic
capability of handling them. Threequarters of all refugees in the world have
been iu a situation of temporary asylun for over five years (Stein 196?).
The following diagram (Figure l) depicts the situation.
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the result is the creation of explosive forces which threaten further destabiliza-
tion to the international order.
The pressure cooker produces effects on alt countries providing different
durable solutions 
- 
including countries which contribute to the permanent
solution of the refugee problem by offering opportunities for resettlement.
Canada, for example, defines itself as a country of resettlement in contrast to a
country of first asylum. Canada responds to the pressure cooker by trying to
limit the spontaneous arrival of refugees. One Canadian method is to impose
visas on entrants from refugee-producing countries as well as on entrants from
countries which, though they do not produce refugees, are sources of refugee
claimants (Portugal, for example). This can be documented by the history of
Canadian legislation, the discussion behind that legislation, the parliamentary
debate in the legislature, explicit government statements by the minislsl in'
charge, the analysis of legislation itself, explicit patterns of decisions reaffirm-
ing Canada's role as a country of resettlement in'contrast to a country of
asylum, and, most clearly, specific progranmes, such as the imposition of
visas. The attenpt to control the spoutaneous arrival of refugees can be
rationalized as more efficacious on a humanitarian level in that refugee
clai'nants witt'i'r Canada cost three t'mes as much to prooess as those
Canadians select abroad. It can also be said to be fairer. Refugees who are per-
sistent and innovative (and who are overwhelmingly male) dominate the spon-
taneous arrivals into Canada; in caraps, women and children predominate,.
and they and others in the camps rarely have the resouroes or the independence
to make 9anada a country of first asylum.
The effect of spontaneous arrivals in countries which define ttremselves as
resettlement countries and which do not want to handle spontaneous arrivals,
is to give a new twist to the meaning of asylum. Asylum has become another
route to a durable solution. Loescher and Scanlan (1986: 78) use the term this
way, 'Haitians found tle principal barrier to formal or informal asylum vas
the progressively cozier relationship between the United States and the govern-
m€nt of Haiti.'
For countries adjacent to refugee-producing areas (Thailand and Pakistan),
asylnrn comes to mean 
.the accqtonce of permanent refugees under the
Ianguage of temporary agylum; for first world countries, like Canada, it comes
to mean providiDg another avenue for a durable solution, but one in which the
initiative is takea by the refugee and not by the sovereign state of Canada. Itr
third world countries, asylum means de lacto but nor de jure p€manent
status. In first world countries, such as Canada, it often irnplies usrng de iure
opportunities to establish Canada as, defacto, a country of first asylum even
if it is reluctant to define ita,elf de jure as one. Hence the tremendous debate in
Caaada ovcr the refugec status deternination procedures which allow refugee
slai'nants to come directly to Canada to have their claim vetted independently
of the refugee selection system.
In sum, for settlement couotries (e.g. Tbailano, asylum means permanent
settlement (because of mass movements), in spite of the overt policies of settle-
ment countries to provide only a temporary solution. In resettlement countries
(e.g. Canada), asylum treans permanent settlement (because of individual
initiatives) in spite of the overt policies of the receiving country to limit the
number of opportunities for spontaneous arrivats.
A parallel shift has taken place in repatriation. A closer look at the reparia-
tion experience indicates that an informal proaess has gone on indepcndently
and in spite of the formal process of repatriation (Stein, forthcoming), because
the forrral processes provided added risk rather than added frotection. As a
resutt, asylnrn comes to mean permalent refuge, rath€r than tenporary
refuge, and a refuge deternrined by the initiative of the refugees in spite of the
poliiies of the refugee-receiving countries.
The issue of asylum versus refuge, previously considered to be oDe of tqn-
porarlt versus durable solutions, needs to be recast in terms of empirical
realities. (For the contrast is one that serves official international policy
makers and those concerned witb formal tegal procedures.) Tte old
framework of t'emporary versus durable solution does not reflect the more
relevant and guite different de facto con&st between refugee-initiated solu-
tions and state and inter-state-initiated and sanctioned solutions. The problem
of asylum, whether in countries of repatriation, countries of first settlenent or
countries of resettlement, is not one of temporary versus durable, but one of
less durable, more tentative solutions that are refugee-initiated versus formally
durable solutions that are sanctioned aad endorsed by states. The old contrast
of temporary versus durable allows the official international policy makers
and those preoccupied with legal procedures to avoid deating with the reality
of individual refugee initiatives, on the one hand, and state powo which
prevents a formally sanctioned solution of a refugee situation, on the other
hand.
The general problem must be placed in a theoreticat context of state
sovereignty, and specific refugee policy in a concrete conteJrt of the foreign
policy of a particular couatry related to the domestic attitudes of its citizens.
Rapid changes in techaology and transportation continually challenge those
countries which want absolute sovereign control over who can and who cannot
enter a state as a prerequisite to becoming members of those states. At the
same time, the traditions of church sanctuary in tandem with the human rights
movement have provided an historical, intellectual and moral basis for
challenging the concept of the absolute sovereignty of the state.
Thus, asylum versus refuge as optiors come to mean not temporary versus
permanent, but individually initiated solutions versus those sanctioned and
controlled by the state. It is this philosophical debate that will be discussed in
this essay.
Qua liJy i n g S ov e r eig nt y
Michael Walzer (1983: 3t) noted: 'lhe primary good that we distribute to one
another is membership in some human community.' In granting membe.rship
in the political community known as the state, three different issues can be
considered. First, is it or should it be the absolute prerogative of th€ members
of that state, through the elected representatives, to decide whom to admit and
whom not to admit as members? ([he question refers, of course, to democratic
states in which, rootd in a social contract tbeory of the state, the governing
body acs on behalf of the citizens and not in its own inrcrests.) Secondly, if
that absolute sovereignty is to be qualifred, who qualifies it? Thirdly, on what
grounds should that sovereignty be qualified? The three issues are linked. The
first issue is about absolute versus qualified sovereignty. The second issue is
who has the autbority to qualify it. These first two issues are rooted in the
larger one of the grounds for acccptance of new menbers h a state. Does the
aulhority for making the decision rct wholly within the bounds of the
members of the state, or can sovereigp decision making autbority be qualifred
in some way by Eranting inalienable rights to non-membgrs of a state to make
slairns for membership in that state? What are the grounds for granting such
rights to non-members? Do€s an international authority, or internationd
norns and moral standards play any role in Fanting such rights? lVhen the
underlying philosophical issue is approached (rather than analysed), it is
usually cast in terms of the first issue above 
- 
absolute versus qualified
sovereipty. In some assessments developiqg the issue a little further (Grabl-
Madsen 196O, absolute sovereipty is identified with a positive approach to
law, and qualified sovereipty with a view of law bounded by mo;d precrpts,
such as human rights, international responsibilities and responsiveness to
civilized sensibilities. Therefore, even when these issues 
- 
whether absolute
sovereignty should be qualified, who can qudify it and on what grounds 
- 
are
touched upon, the question is begged whether absolute sovereignty should or
should not be qualifred. The argunents for justifying qualified sovereignty (or
ab$olute sovereignty, for that natter), simply shift focus to the debate between
a view of law as a convention rooted in self-interest (a relativist view of law)
versus a view of law rooted in and governed by moral precepts. Tbe relativbt
view of law is allied with absolute sovereigpty. By its very nature, it is indif-
ferent to the welfare or interests of others (non-members of the state) who do
not make the law. The view of law rooted in a higfter 
'niversal morality of
some sort is linked witb qualified or relative sovereignty.
Unless the arguments for qualifying sovereignty, or for restrieting absolute
control to members of the state, are unpacked and examined, the issue of
whether or not to grant greater room for the self-initiative of refugees to deter-
mine an acceptable solution for themselves will remain a matter of taste rather
than.one of intellectual judgement.
Should sovereignty be absotute or qualified? To answer this, we can shift to
the second issue 
- 
who can qualify absolute sovereignty? The usud assump-
tion is that [he issue involves demarcating which non-members (usually a very,
very small group) have the right to qualify the absolute character of sovereignty.
But it can be argued that only the members of the state have the right to
qualify absolute sovereignty, and that they ought to do so on moral grounds.
That is, if members of a state have the absolute power to qualify that power,
they ought to qualify it because of overriding moral requirements.
I want to make a much stronger case. I want to argue that not only can the
initiative to qualify absolu0e control come from the state that has it, but the
very prernises of absolute sovereignty argue for, if not dictate, such a
qualification. In other wsrds, the premises of absolute sovereignty push for
and even dictate qualified sovereignty. Absolute and qualified sovereignty are
not polar opposites; qualified sovereignty is a logical product of the principles
of absolute sovereignty when applied to particular existential situations.
SelfJnterut as the Basis for Qualified Sovereignty
The prenise of absolute sovereign control over who should or ehould not be
members of one's political community is generally considered to be self-
interest. Only the members of a state can determine whom to admit or not to
admit into membership on the basis of the collective self-interest of the existing
members. Thus, for example, Canadian foreign policy was deliberately shifted
from the perspective of the Pearsonian goodhearted international broker to a
policy based on self-interest during the third majority rule of the Liberal Party
under Pierre Elliot Trudeau (see, for exarnple, Dewitt and Kirten 1983, Gwyn
1980).
Ttre first set'of arguments which I wish to put forth accept that the principle
of absolute sovereignty is rooted in self-interest, but argue that self-interest
argues for and even dictates qualifying that sovereignty. Four arguments c:ln
be considered supporting the podition that it is in the collective self-interest of
existing members to qualify their own absolute sovereignty and allow a self-
initiated refugee to contribute to the determination of a membership cfaim.
The first argument is that it is a logical ortension of the principle of self-
interest. For if the state is given absolute control over membership issues, then
the reality is that such authority will be wield€d by bureaucrats. An assump
tion is made that any increase in the authority of bureaucrats tends to lessen
the chance that the authority will be wielded in the self-interest of the citizenry.
The result will be a decline in the initiative and responsibility of individual
citizens which the state was designed to enhance, not inhibit. There may be a
conflict between the pursuit of self-interest, as the basis for the creation of the
state, which the authorities of &e state are there to prot€ct, and the fact that
those same authorities, in the name of protecting the individual citizens, will
arrogate that authority to serve their own interests and develop a monopoly on
power. That is, rather than using their formal authority to assess thb degree to
which a decision fosters the self-interest of the citizens, they will refer to and
use references to yfears, mostly irrational, of a segment of the citizenry to
enhance their own control over who should or should not be a member of the
nation-state. It may in fact be the case that spontaneous arrivals who are not
selected by a bureaucracy but who nonetletess meet a set of norms and fulfil
certain principles of the state will become as good if not better members than
those cftosen by a bureaucratic state. Those who demonstrate the determina-
tion, initiative and perspicacity to find the means to arrive in a country like
Canada to make a refugee claim'(as distinguished from those selected abroad),
or those who manage to settle and prosper in a country of first asylum without
official support, or those who manage to repatriate on their own, are the very
individuals that a country wants as its members if the country is based on a
philosophy that it is constitutd because of the self-interests of the individuals
who make up the state and was created to enhance those self-interests.
lndividuals who demonstrate the best initiative in protecting and ensuring their
own personal survival are ideal targets for inclusion in a state rooted in a prin-
ciple of self-interest. To summarize, qualifying absolute sovereignty is not
only consistent with but also a logical extension of the principle of self-
interest.
The second argument suggests that taking in refugees as a malter of their
right is not simply a logical extension of the state constituted to serve and
enhance the self-interests of its members, but is a way of giving witness, of
demonstrating the principles of such a state in contrast, for example, to those
states oste.nsibly dedicated to the welfare of the citizenry as a whole. Countries
founded to serve and enhance the self-interest of their members contrast with
tlose states constituted not to serve the individual self-interest of their
members but rather the collective self-interest defined by a small core within
the leadership. In other words, it is not surprising that it is countries with a
democratic liberal tradition (in contrast to Marxist-Leninist states) which grant
refugees the right to claim status, Such a stance exemplifies, in the highest
sense, the premises of a state set up on the basis that there was a1 implicit
social contract among its mernbers, and that the state exists to serve those
members and not some idea of justice in the eyes of a few. Opening one's
doors to the claims of individual refugees exemplifies in the best way possible
that the state exists to serve individuol self-interested claims and not abstract
principles of justice articulated by an elite.
Qualifyrng absolute sovereignty, thirdly, is, in fact, a litmus test of whether
a state is truly a social contract state or one in which a benign leadership deter-
mines what is in everyone's self-interest. In other words, granting rights to
individual refugee claimants not only is a logical extension, not only is an
existential expression of a subjective set of beliefs, but also provides an objec-
tive standard by which to assess and judge the degree to which a state truly
adheres to such principles.
Finally, it is in the self-interest of a state and its members to preserve inter-
national order. In a world in which there is effectively no territory left which is
not under the jurisdiction of a state and, therefore, where it is no longer pos-
sible to flee to a newland where a new social contract can be devised, it is in
the interests of existing states to ensure that every individud who lacks the pro-
tection ofa state has an opportunity to gain such protection. The preservation
of international order is in the self-interest of any state. Since self-interested
states will by their very nature tend to acknowledge the risk of disorder only
when crisis is upon them, it is better for individuals who lack the protection of
a state, and who could become an explosive force, to seek out that protection
themselves when it is'not granted freely. The alternative is, by inaction,
encouraging the stateless to set off explosives to demonstrate that no one can
have the protection of a state as long as that protection is denied to them.
All these arguments accept the premise that a state has absolute sovereign
control over who can and whb cannot become members of that state. Asbum-
ing a tiberal, derrocratic, abscilute sovereign state based on an implicit social
contract among its members to serve and protect their self-interests, it is in
their interests to qualify that absolute sovereigrrty and allow some individuals
who are not members to seek nembership as a matter of right rather than
simply an extension of privilege.
The Social Contraet ond Qualified Sovereignty
The above 'set of arguments presume that absolute sovereignty is a con-
se,quence of a state constituted by the social contract of its members, but the
prepises of the contact dictate that those same members decide to qualify that
sovereignty. The following argumenb suggest that a social contrast state does
not le€ld to a eoncept of absolute sovereignty in the first place, but inherently
qualifies that solereignty. In sum, we argue tbat absolute sovereign control
over membership is in fact not even inherent in the character of a state.
The fust atgument notes that if you accept that absolute control over
meqbership is a prerogative of states, then it follows logicauy that states Bot
only decide who can and who cannot become member$, but also can cxpcl exist-
ing members. Further, the state can prevent a member from leaving. For if
members in contracting to form a state have delegated absolute control over
future membership to that state, theu that absolute control governs not only
entry criteria but dso exit criteria, including both forceful expulsion and the
prwention of members from leaving. Since liberal states are generally grantd
the authority over admissions but nof authority over exit for bona fide
members of that state (with th€ exception of those deemed to have committed
a criminal act who may be prevented from leaving), then states based on liberal
premises carnot have an absolute sovereign control over membership. Rather,
sovereign control is at best restricted to new admissions, for: 'The restraint of
entry serves to defeld the liberty and welfare, the'politics and culture of a
group of people committed to one another and to their common life. But the
restraint of exit replaces commitment witb coercion' (Walzer 1983: 39). If we
then grant that a state does not have absolute sovereign authority over
membership but only absolute sovereign authority over the admission of new
members, is that sovereign control sulject to any qualifications? Another
argurnent for such qualification goes back to tle premise of a state assumed to
be based on a social contract. There are really tlree key terms to that social
contract. First, the function of the state is to protest the individual interests of
its citizens without infringing on any rights that they did not surrender to srate
authority. This pre.rise has already been discussed. But there.are two others.
The state is granted a monopoly on the use of coercive power. Thirdly, the
state has dominion over a particular segment of territory on the planet earth in
which its citizens miy enhance their well being.
Note, the only monopoly given to the state is the use of coercive power. The
onty area in which the state has ultimate dominion is its own territory. Ter-
ritorial dominion is not simply a product of the efficacious use of the coercive
power by the state, that is, a produet of the gse of force by a state, but is also a
result of a recognition of those b.oundaries by other states. If boundaries
depend on recognition by others, such recognition is not granted in an
unqualilied way. Recogrition of boundaries does not grant absolute control
over entry because the recognition of boundaries is subject to everyone having
a place to live once all the tenitory on eanh has been divided up among the
states. As long as individuals are left who do not have a place to live and a state
to protect their self-interests, no state has absolute control over enrrl-into its
territory even though it has absohite dominion over that territory.
Thus, the absolute sovereignty of a state with respect to membership is
restricted in at least fwo ways: tle sovereignty applies to entry into member-
ship and not exit from it. Secondly, the sovereigoty is subject to the condition
of controlling entry of bona fide members of other states, but not of
individuats who d<i not have membership in any state. Ia other words, absolute
sovereignty with respea to memtership is qualilied with respect to its own
members and witb respest to individuals who are not nembers of any states.
What about members of states which do not fulfil their function of protec-
ting tbeir members? Have these people been thnrst back into a state of nature
where the state, in breaching the implicit social contract, has made them de
focto statelas if not de jureil From thi( perspective, tle sovbreignty of a state is
qualified for individuals who lack either de iure or de f,acto membership in
another statc.
A third challenge to the assumption of absolute sovereign control bears
more on the right to protcction within a state for non-members than the right
of entry into the territory. The issue is posed by institutions that are part of the
society of that state. For thougb individuals may have ganted the state a
monopoly in the use of coergive force and a dominion over tlie territory of that
state, subject to recopition by other states, the state was granted neither a
monopoly to protect its citiz€ns nor absolute dominion to ensure that protec-
tion was carried out. Monopoly over the use of coercive force does not entail
monopoly over protectioa. Doninion over tenitory does not entail dominion
over citizens. Though the state has a function to protect and enhance the
welfare of its citizens, this functisa is not the erclusive prerogative of the state,
nor was the state givetdominion status over all other camFuniliss which serve
to protect citizens.
Ip other words, a monopoly over coercive force and dominion over territory
dp not exteqd these areas of absolute sovereignty into a monopoly in and
dominion over the protective function. Siuce the state does not have a
monopoly or dominion over the protection of its own citizens, it certainly can-
not monopolizn, or dominate the protective function extended towards non-
citizens. Thus, ifinstitutions, such as churches, have played an historic role of
protection 
- 
in this case, providing sanctuary to those whose lives were in
danger 
- 
then the sovereignty of the state c,annot llmit the protection those
institutions offer non-m€mbers, unless the state can demonstrate that those
non-members pose a threat to the interests of existing members or are an econo-
mic burden upon tbe public at large. But if the non-memben are supported
and protected by a church, for example, then the state may not have the
absolute sovereign authority to deny those individuals that protection by
institutions which may'historically predate the creation of the state.
Finally, in the original social contract implicit in the creation of a liberal
state, the powers surrendered to the state were limited. In some states (the
U.S.A.) even the monopoly on the use of coercive force was qualified so that
individual citizens retained the right to bear arms for their self-protection.
Whatever the vdriations in different states on the limited powers and authority
surrendered to that state, in zo state did individuals surrender their human
rights on becoming fiembers of a state. For these were not just rights that
individuals chose not to surrender; they were rights that were inherently theirs
and could not be surrendered. Consequcntly, though Bills of Rights may or
may not be included in the constitutions of all statd, the sovereignty of all
states is always subjec"t to the limit that states cannot infringe on anyone's
human rights. Since the yery nature'and creation of the state recognized that it
is the riglrr of every human being to have a place to live, then any individual,
and not just members of a state, have the right to claim a place to live within
that state provided that right has not already been both exercised and'recog-
nized elsewhere. Therefore, it is the duty of dvery state, in recognition of the
rights of humans, to set up a judicial process to adjudicate fairly any claims
for the exercise of such rights, that is, individual rights to a place to live in a
state which provides protection from persecution. This does not entail that the
state guarantee a productive livelihood or an income. Economic migrants will
not have rights to make a rcfugee claim.
A Penpective on the Arguments
Two very different but complementary criteria have been offered to establish
that the alleged absolute sovereignty of a state ougfit to be qualified on the
grounds of self-interest and is, in fact, already qualified when the bases of a
social contract s&tte are examined. Further, these criteria elaborate the
grounds for that qualification. One set of grounds was based on examining
what it meant for the state to function solely on selfinterest principles. The
second set of criteria argued essentially that, whether or not self-interest ofits
members was the premise upon which a state was created, the powers of that
state were definitely circumscribed with respect to the aspects of membership
over which it could exercise sovereign control (entry versus exit) and with
respect to those individuals over whom it could exercise such absolute control(only individuals who were members of other states and were protected by
those states could be absolutely rejected). Further, the protective function was
neither the state's erclusive mandate nor did the state have absolute dorninion
over other institutions in society that performed protective functions. Finally,
all such protective functions and controls over entry were subject to the
recognition of the righa of all men qua human.
These arguments are not new. However, they have generally been cast simply
in moral terms. For example, states are urged to respect the sensibilities of
their own citizens without defining what those sensibilities wgre that placed
limits on t}te power of the state or why they should be recognized for having
that effect. The argument that a state had international responsibilities under
international'conventions did not elaborate precisely what those respon-
sibitities were to individuals who were not its own citizens or why the state had
or ought to have such responsibilities. Sometimes the argunents were even
more vague and abstract, appealing to the responsibiliqy of a state qua divilized,
without demonitrating that the nature of a civilized state requires that state to
recognize that, in the development of civilization, the family and religious
institutions (to name just two) have played and will continue to play a role in
the protection of individuds. A state qua civilized cannot presume to have
exclusive control and dominion over protective functions. Finally, traditiond
organizations such is churches, and new ones, such as Amnesty lnternational,
with a primary concern for human rights, have ev€ry right to challenge states
and insist that the responsibilities of a state are always subject to a respect for
human riChts.
Evaluating QualiJied Sovereignty
When we'evaluate this qualified sovereignty in opposition to claims for
absolute sovereignty, we find three sorts of arguments to reinforce absolute
sovereignty at the expense of <jualified sovereignty.
The first argument is based on historical precedent. It always boils dowri to
the fact that states have traditionally always resisted any modifications to the
controls they already exercised. This is the point behind the argument that
Canada traditionally regarded itself as a country of resettlement and not as a
country of asylum, tltat is, where refugees were selected by the state for entry
and not where they self-selected. The argument is obviously self-serving. It
serves to obscure the fact that Canada's emergence as a country open to
refugee resettlement is of very recent vintage. The history of Canada bearq a
much longer witness to a country which deliberately kept out people on
grounds of race and religion. Abella and Troper (1982) demonstrate that, as
late as the post World War II period, that pattern was exercised to exclude
Jewish refugees.
The argument for tradition errs in presuming that what is is what ought to
be. A reverse argument can be made. What ought to be is indicated precisely
by the historical pattern of what is presumed to be a giv6n 
- 
such as the racial
ch'aracter of Canada or the assunrption that Canada and Canada alone
(through its civil servants) decides who can and who cannot enter.
The historical precedent argument also utilizes a false opposition. For it is
not the case, nor ought it to be the case, that a country is either a country of
asylum or a country of resettlement. Thailand is a country of settlement and
asylum. Canada does not deport Sri Lankans, for example, but, like Thailand,
is responsible for leaving large groups of refugees in limbo. The either/or logic
here is neither descriptive nor prescriptive.
But what about the issue of efficacy? Is it not more economical for Canada
to select abroad rather than set up a very costly legal process for adjudicating a
fen, claims? If three times as many people can be selected abroad at the same
cost of processing one refugee on a self-selection principle, is this not far more
cost effective per refugee?
Since oristing procedures are curnbersome and lengthy, based as they are on
a system designed to rule on deportation but then submitting that deportation
ruling to multiple reviews, present cost comparisons are of little relevance.
Cost comparisons would need to be made with a system s€t up from the start to
process claims fairly and efficiently.
If after such refor:ns it still proved more costty to process a refugee claim
within Canada than to select abroad, this would not justify eliminating the
self-selection process. It would be like arguing we should never have trial byjury since trial by judge is more cost effective. Comparing an administr4liv6
procedure to one operating in a quasi-judicial way is inappropriate. The latter
is an iszue of law and rigbt and not just benevolence. The frst may be more
cost effective, but it may dery protection to those in necd who have the right to
insist on such protection. But is this tle case? Cannot a system built upon
benevolence be fairer in that a self*election system rewards males with the
resources and initiative to get into the Canadian system? The selection system,
it is argued, helps more refugees, and, further, helps more of those with
Sleater needs than a self-selection system.
A few questions sbould be sufficient to undemine this argument. First,
would a selection $ystem in Guatemala and El Salvador have ever been started
t'nless self-selected refugees had fust arrived in Canada, alerting the govern-
ment of the desperate situation there? Secondly, why does a selection system
have to be seen as a substitute or alternative to a self-selection system 
- 
why
are they not considered complementary? Thirdly, a self-selection system
results in entry to sipificant numbers of legitimate refugees, even if a small
pircentage of the total;.does this not suggest that it is important to retain a
self-selection window of opportunity for those who cannot or will not take
advantage of opportunities in their home countries? Those individuals who
take the opponunity may indeed be the oneE most at risk.
Conclusion
I'have tried to indicate the shift in debate from viewing the issue of refuge ver-
sus asylum as an issue of temporary versus durable sotutions to one of the
principle of self-selectivity versus bureaucratic control. Secondly, I have tried
to show that the justifications for absolute sovereign control w[ich bureau-
crats and states use to justify their restrictions on refugees is not based on self-
interest but may in fact be contrary to self-interest. In either case, the prernise
of absolute sovereign control over entry is a philosophical myth which does
not accord with the philosophical premises of the liberal state. In fact, those
premises dictate sperific quafifications to that sovereignty.
I have no1 argued for self-selection instead of refuge, or suggested that self-
selection 63s 3 higher moral value or is dictated by a higher sense of charity or
mutuat aid. In fact, I have tried to argue that qualified sovereignty which
$ants rights to refugees who are already within one's own countiry be
established quite independently of the rival issues at stake based on the
ass"'nptions ofa liberal state and on the qualifications and conditions attach€d
to those premises.
Once the logic of the refugevetsus asylum argument is undercut in favour of
refuge plus asylum, the arguments of history, cost efficiency and mutual
exclusivity to reinforce the idea of absolute sovereignty also begin to look very
tenuous.
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